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Abstract
Recent studies have shown that involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) can be elicited in the laboratory. Here we
assessed whether the specific instructions given to participants can change the nature of the IAMs reported, in terms of
both their frequency and their characteristics. People were either made or not made aware that the aim of the study was to
examine IAMs. They reported mental contents either whenever they became aware of them or following a predetermined
schedule. Both making people aware of the aim of the study and following a fixed schedule of interruptions increased
significantly the number of IAMs reported. When aware of the aim of the study, participants reported more specific
memories that had been retrieved and rehearsed more often in the past. These findings demonstrate that the number and
characteristics of memories depend on the procedure used. Explanations of these effects and their implications for research
on IAMs are discussed.
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Introduction
Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) are spontane-
ously arising memories of personal events that come to mind with
no deliberate attempt directed at their retrieval [1,2]. Recent
studies [3–6] have shown that IAMs can be elicited and
experimentally investigated in the laboratory. In the present study
we assessed whether the instructions given to participants can
change the nature of memories reported. We show that changing
specific details of the procedure strongly affects their retrieval, in
terms of both their frequency and their phenomenological
properties. Two variables have been manipulated in the present
study, 1) whether people are made aware that the aim of the study
is to examine IAMs and 2) whether they report their mental
contents whenever they become aware of them or when requested
to do so at random times set by a predetermined schedule.
Historically, the most common approach for studying IAMs has
been the naturalistic diary method (e.g., [7–9]), in which
individuals are asked to keep a diary of IAMs they experience in
everyday life. These studies have shown that, when asked to report
IAMs, people do so frequently, with routine daily occurrences of
about 3–5 per day [7,9], and that IAMs are at least as common
(and presumably even more common) in daily life than are
voluntary autobiographical memories [10]. They usually occur
when one is engaged in undemanding activities that require little
attention and concentration (e.g. during relaxation and routine
activities) (e.g., [8,11]). In most cases involuntary memories are
reported to be elicited by identifiable cues that are generally
related to prominent, possibly thematic, aspects of the remem-
bered experiences (e.g., [7,8,12]).
The diary studies have also revealed that most IAMs refer to
specific and mainly positive episodes (e.g., [13], but see [6]).
Although diary studies provide many important basic findings,
there are also intrinsic limitations related to this specific
methodology, the inability to manipulate variables being the most
obvious pitfall, as it limits the number of questions that can be
addressed.
Two novel experimental methods have been successful in
eliciting and measuring IAMs in the laboratory. They have
simulated the conditions that in more naturalistic diary studies
have shown to facilitate the production of IAMs, including using
monotonous undemanding cognitive tasks. In a paradigm based
on retrospective evaluations [3], participants were required to
produce free associations to word cues (concrete nouns). At the
end of the session, participants decided if a personal experience
might have come to mind while giving these responses. Although
the most participants provided a stream of semantic associations,
participants also reported autobiographical memories on 86% of
the trials.
In the other laboratory task [6], participants were asked to
perform an undemanding vigilance task while being simultaneous-
ly exposed to irrelevant cue-phrases presented on the screen.
Several involuntary memories were generated throughout the task,
the majority triggered by the cues. When compared to voluntary
memories obtained via a similar procedure [6], IAMs were more
likely to be about specific past episodes and to be retrieved in
response to negative cues. Retrieval time was almost twice as fast
for IAMs than for voluntary memories.
In the word-association task developed by Ball [3], the
participants were not provided with any information about
involuntary memory retrieval until after they had provided all of
their free associations. Thus, one might assume that they were not
voluntarily retrieving autobiographical experiences to satisfy a
demand characteristic of the experiment. Conversely, in the
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vigilance paradigm developed by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili [6]
‘‘participants were informed that some unrelated thoughts could
be past memories that spontaneously ‘‘pop’’ to mind, and the
nature of involuntary autobiographical memory was explained’’
([6], p. 923).
As in diary studies, in this procedure people were informed that
they were to report involuntary memories. Explicit instructions to
report IAMs can have three unwanted effects. It can induce
retrieval processes that are more similar to those of voluntary
retrieval of autobiographical memories (hereinafter ABMs), in
which case one should expect to find more memories compared to
genuine involuntary retrieval, as in voluntary retrieval people
typically report one memory per cue. A second possible effect is to
create an overall priming of autobiographical contents, which
would in general make ABMs more available. In this case too, one
expects an increase in memories, and mainly of memories that are
more accessible (e.g. those that have been previously rehearsed or
reported). Third, instructions focusing on involuntary memories
could also activate retrieval selection, setting the focus of attention
on retrieval of ABMs or triggering a report bias that would limit
the report to what people naively understand involuntary
memories should be (e.g. specific personal events that are vivid
and detailed). In all these cases, the retrieval and the nature of
IAMs obtained might not be representative of naturally occurring
IAMs, with the consequence that conclusions about the nature of
IAMs reached with the Schlagman and Kvavilashvili [6] study
might be incomplete or partially incorrect.
To assess this possibility, we compared involuntary memories
reported in two conditions, one in which participants were told
that the experimenters were interested in involuntary memories
and another in which they were asked to report involuntary
thoughts without any specific mention of memory. This was
crossed with two other conditions, one in which participants were
instructed to interrupt the task whenever a memory or a thought
came to mind (depending on the condition) and one in which the
task was interrupted by the experimenter according to a
predetermined schedule. Not instructing participants to focus on
involuntary memories and avoiding to mention of the word
‘‘memory’’ are supposed to enhance the chance to obtain
memories that are truly involuntary. This should prevent priming
of ABMs, and participants would less likely engage involuntary
retrieval, or intentional selection of mental contents that they
consider ‘‘memories’’. These changes also made the task more
similar to a typical mind-wandering task. In the present study we
compared the number and characteristics of IAMs in the four
conditions (see procedure below).
In both diary and laboratory studies on IAMs, participants are
asked to report their memories using self-interruption. However,
studies on mind wandering have shown that individuals routinely
fail (at least temporarily) to notice that their minds have wandered,
as they are only intermittently aware of their internal state (see for
a review [14]). By contrast, when prompted by the experimenter,
people can accurately report whether or not they are in a mind-
wandering state. In response to queries about this procedure, they
routinely indicate that they had been unaware of their mind
wandering up until the time the probe was presented. Moreover,
when participants classify mind-wandering episodes as unaware,
their performance [15] and neurocognitive activity [16] system-
atically differ from when they report having been aware that they
were mind wandering.
Similarly to what happens in mind-wandering tasks, in which
people ‘zone out’ and are often unaware of the constant flux of
mental contents, participants in our self-interruption condition
might stop themselves only if they notice that they have a memory
or thought. They might then omit reporting memories/thoughts
on numerous occasions. However, if stopped they might become
aware of having memories/thoughts at the moment or seconds
earlier. We thus predicted a higher number of memories and
thoughts in the experimenter-interruption conditions, because
potential recovery from zoning out states would make participants
realize they had been having thoughts/memories of which they
were not aware of.
In the present study we used a modified version of the
Schlagman and Kvavilashvili [6] paradigm, in which participants
were asked to report whatever came spontaneously to their mind,
including plans, generic thoughts, intentions for the future, past
experiences, etc. Crucially, participants were not instructed to
focus on involuntary memories and mention of the word
‘‘memory’’ was also avoided. These changes were intended to
enhance the likelihood of obtaining memories that were truly
involuntary. Not mentioning memory in the instructions should
prevent priming of ABMs, and participants would less likely
engage in voluntary retrieval, or intentional selection of mental
contents that they consider ‘‘memories’’. These changes also made
the task more similar to a typical mind-wandering task.
In the new procedure, participants were instructed to report
task-unrelated mental contents when these spontaneously popped
into their mind, and to do so by interrupting the presentation of
the stimuli and writing down a very short description of the mental
content. They were told that the description, although short,
should be sufficiently detailed to allow them to later identify what
the mental content was. At the end of the presentation of all the
stimuli, participants were asked to indicate which of the written
mental contents referred to past events (i.e. memories) and which
did not. With important differences, the method used in this study
is similar to the two-step recording procedure extensively used in
structured diary studies of IAMs (e.g., [7,8,17,18]). In the original
two-step method, participants make a preliminary record of the
memory when the involuntary memory occurs, by recording
keyword phrases in answer to a fixed set of questions listed in a
small notebook. Step two involves filling out at a later time, self-
chosen, a more extensive questionnaire about each memory. In
our task, at step two participants identified the memory and
elaborated on them. This might require more retrospection than
the original two-step procedure.
The reason to have participants fill out the questionnaires at the
end of the stimuli presentation was because a pilot study with the
original Schlagman and Kvavilashvili [6] procedure (in which
questionnaires were filled out after each single interruption)
indicated that, although participants interrupted several times
during the first half of the stimuli presentation, they stopped
interrupting and reporting after a while and indicated that this was
due to the need to fill out the questionnaire every single time. By
shortening the immediate report we aimed at ensuring that
participants reported memories throughout the vigilance task.
To summarize the whole design, we compared the effect on the
frequency and characteristics of IAMs of two factors, a) Instruction
type (2 levels, with vs. without mentioning IAMs) and b)
Interruption type (2 levels, self-interruption vs. experimenter-
interruption).
Method
This research was approved by the Ethics Committee of the
Department of Psychology, University of Hull, UK. Participants
were asked to sign the informed consent form, which was part of
the ethics application approved by the ethics committees. In it
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participants were told that the study examined the mental content
of people during a vigilance task.
Participants
Forty eight undergraduates from the University of Hull (29
females, age range 18–35, mean age 20.4) participated in the
experiment. They were native English speakers, and had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. A preliminary informal interview
assessed the presence of physical or mental problems and the
consumption of medications. None of our participants had to be
excluded on the basis of the results of the interview. Participants
were randomly assigned to four experimental conditions, with 12
participants in each condition. Age difference among the four
groups was not significant.
Materials
Vigilance Task. The same vigilance task was used as in [6].
The task consisted of 800 trials, presented in a continuous fixed
order, each remaining on the screen for 1.5 sec. In each trial an
image was shown depicting either a pattern of black horizontal
(non- target stimuli) or black vertical lines (target stimuli). Target
stimuli appeared on 15 trials and were presented randomly every
40–60 trials, in order to ensure presentation at fairly long and
irregular intervals. Each image showed also a word phrase (e.g.
relaxing on a beach, supportive friend, see Appendix S2) in size 18
Arial in the middle of the image. The short sentences were taken
from the standardized pool of 800 cues that had been rated for
emotional valence by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili [6]. An
approximately equal numbers of negative (n = 267), neutral
(n = 266), and positive (n = 267) phrases were used.
Questionnaire. Participants recorded details of each mem-
ory on the two-page questionnaire used by Schlagman and
Kvavilashvili [6]. Instructions were exactly the same as those used
by Schlagman and Kvavilashvili [6]. On the first page, partic-
ipants wrote a brief description of the memory and rated the
vividness of the memory on a 7-point scale (1 = very vague, almost
no image at all; 7 = very vivid, almost like normal vision), indicated
the trigger of the memory (their thoughts, an external trigger - in
which case they had to mention which - or no trigger). On page 2,
they rated on 5-point scales their overall level of concentration
during the vigilance task (1 = not at all concentrating; 5 = fully
concentrating), how unusual or common the remembered event
was (1 = very common; 5 = very unusual), how often the memory
had been thought of/rehearsed before (1 = never; 2 = once or
twice; 3 = a few times; 4 = several times; 5 = many times), how
pleasant or unpleasant the memory event was (1 = very unpleas-
ant; 3 = neutral; 5 = very unpleasant), how pleasant or unpleasant
the original event was (1 = very unpleasant; 3 = neutral; 5 = very
pleasant). They were also asked whether the remembered event
was general or specific, and indicated their age when the event
occurred. Participants received instructions on how to identify a
general and a specific event.
Procedure
Design. This was a 2 (Instruction type: with vs. without
mentioning IAMs)62 (Interruption type: Self-interruption vs.
Experimenter-interruption) design, with both factors manipulated
between subjects.
Participants were tested individually. First they were asked to
read information on the vigilance task explaining they were to
detect randomly presented target stimuli (patterns of vertical lines)
from a large number of non-target stimuli (patterns of horizontal
lines). Each time a target stimulus was detected participants were
to say ‘‘yes’’ out loud. They were told to ignore the words in the
center of the pattern and that, due to the task being quite
monotonous, they might find themselves thinking about other
things, which was quite normal.
Instructions were the same in all conditions, except for the
crucial differences that are mentioned below for each condition.
The common part of the instructions is reported in Appendix S1.
Participants in the ‘‘IAM instructions/Self-interruption’’ condi-
tion received the original instructions as in Schlagman and
Kvavilashvili [6]. In addition to the part in common to all
conditions (see Appendix S1), in this condition they were told,
‘‘You may find that memories from your past come into your mind
spontaneously without any deliberate attempt to retrieve them, in
other words, a memory that simply ‘pops’ into your head without
you trying to consciously remember anything. We are interested in
studying these involuntary memories.’’ The nature of IAMs was
explained. It was also specified that memories could be about
specific or general events, from one’s recent or remote past, and so
forth. They were reminded that their main task was to respond by
saying ‘‘yes’’ out loud each time they saw the target vertical lines,
but if an involuntary autobiographical memory came to mind,
then they were to click the mouse, which would stop the vigilance
task and record their memory in one or two lines (i.e. a relatively
short sentence). They were told that this initial brief description of
the memory should be sufficient to remind them of the content of
that specific memory at a later point in time. Participants were
presented with their brief descriptions and asked to complete the
two-page questionnaire for each memory only after all stimuli had
been presented and all memories recorded.
Participants in the ‘‘IAM instructions/Experimenter-interrup-
tion’’ condition, received the same instruction as the first group but
they were told that they would be interrupted during the
performance and asked to report any involuntary memories that
were going through their mind that they were aware of at the
moment or/and just before the interruption. For each memory
they were asked to briefly record the content as in the previous
condition. The number of interruptions (n = 13) was established on
the basis of the average number of interruptions (and memories)
obtained in a pilot study with 15 participants using the standard
self-interruption method. Interruptions were scheduled from trial
37 (1st interruption) to trial 763 (13th interruption) and were
randomly spaced over a period of approximately 30 min.
Participants in the ‘‘No IAM instructions/Self-interruption’’
condition received the same instructions as those in the ‘‘IAM
instructions/Self-interruption’’ condition, except that no mention
was made of memories or past memories. Instead participants
were asked to interrupt the presentation of the stimuli when task-
unrelated mental contents (thoughts, plans, considerations, past
events, images, etc.) ‘‘popped’’ into their mind. After all stimuli
had been presented and all mental contents recorded, participants
were informed about the nature of involuntary memories, saw
their brief descriptions, asked to categorize the descriptions as
involuntary memories or non-memory contents (that we called
more generically thoughts), and asked to complete for each of the
memories the two-page questionnaire.
Participants in the ‘‘No IAM instructions/Experimenter-inter-
ruption’’ condition received the same instructions as the previous
group, but they were told that they would be interrupted during
the performance and asked to report any involuntary mental
contents that were going through their mind that they were aware
of at the moment of or just before the interruption.
Each session lasted between 1K and 2 hours, depending on the
number of mental contents or involuntary memories generated.
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Results
All participants completed the vigilance task successfully.
Classification of mental contents as memories or other mental
contents was done relatively easily and quickly. Only on very rare
occasions participants were uncertain whether the content was a
memory or a more generic mental content.
Participants generated a total of 521 IAMs with a mean of 10.86
(SD = 9.02, range 0–37) per participant. Most importantly, out of
48 participants, only 2 participants did not report any involuntary
memories throughout the session, one in the ‘‘No IAM instruc-
tions/Self-interruption’’ and one in ‘‘No IAM instructions/
Experimenter-interruption’’. Out of 521 IAMs, the majority
(76%) were reported to have identifiable triggers. Out of these,
227 (57.3%) were reported to have been triggered by environ-
mental cues and 169 (42.6%) by internal thoughts.
Descriptive data for all dependent variables are reported in
Table 1. The total number of memories was 111 in the ‘‘IAM
instructions/Self-interruption’’ condition; 215 in the ‘‘IAM
instructions/Experimenter-interruption’’; 83 (in addition to 124
thoughts) in ‘‘No IAM instructions/Self-interruption’’; 112 (in
addition to 206 thoughts) in ‘‘No IAM instructions/Experimenter-
interruption’’.
To assess the effect of type of instruction and type of
interruptions on the total number of memories, the average
number of IAMs per person was entered into a 2 (Instruction
Type)62 (Interruption Type) ANOVA. In the ‘‘IAM instructions’’
conditions, in which instructions mentioned IAMs, participants
reported significantly more IAMs (M = 13.58) than participants in
the ‘‘No IAM instructions’’ conditions (M = 8.12), (F (1,44) = 5.27,
p = .027, eta squared = 0.09). The main effect of type of
Interruption was also significant (F (1,44) = 5.43, p = .024, eta
squared = 0.10). More IAMs were reported in the ‘‘Experimenter-
interruption’’ (EI) (M = 13.62) than when in the ‘‘Self-interrup-
tion’’ (SI) (M = 8.08) conditions. The interaction was not
significant (F (1,44) = 1.73, p..19). Participants in the ‘‘Experi-
menter-interruption’’ condition also reported more mental con-
tents (M = 17.17) than participants in the ‘‘Self-interruption’’
condition (M = 10.33) (t (22) = 2.17, p = .04, eta squared = .17).
Recall that in the other ‘‘IAM instructions’’ conditions only
memories were reported.
These results indicate that instructing participants about
involuntary memories increased significantly the number of
involuntary memories reported. A clear increase in memories
was obtained also with scheduled interruptions. Having to report
what they had in mind (memories or task-unrelated mental
contents in general) at unexpected times apparently helped
participants become aware of, and report, their mental contents.
To assess whether the two experimental manipulations affected
the phenomenological quality of the involuntary memories
retrieved, the mean ratings for each recorded memory character-
istic were entered into 262 ANOVAs, with instruction type and
interruption type as independent variables.
Participants in the ‘‘IAM instructions’’ conditions reported a
higher proportion of specific memories (F (1,42) = 4.67, p = .036,
eta squared = .10), and a higher frequency of rehearsed memories
(F (1,42) = 4.61, p = .038, eta squared = .10), compared to partic-
ipants who received ‘‘No IAM instructions’’. There was no
difference between ‘‘Self-interruption’’ and ‘‘Experimenter-inter-
ruption’’ conditions in any memory characteristic, and no
significant interaction.
Discussion
The amount and type of involuntary memories reported
depends strongly on the method used to elicit them. Informing
participants that they had to report ‘involuntary memories’ (IAMs)
during the vigilance task increased significantly the number of
IAMs reported. These memories were also more specific and had
been retrieved and rehearsed more than IAMs reported in the
condition in which people were allowed to report any task-
unrelated mental content.
In addition, more IAMs were reported when participants were
interrupted by the experimenter compared to the self-interruption
condition. However, the characteristics of the memories were not
different between the two types of interruption. The lack of a
significant interaction indicates that the influence of information
about the type of task and about the type of interruption acted
Table 1. Descriptive data** for all dependent measures.
With mentioning IAMs Without mentioning IAMs
SIa EIb SIa EIb
Memories 9.25 (6.17) 17.92 (10.47) 6.92 (6.63) 9.33 (8.94)
(1–22) (7–37) (0–26) (0–29)
Non-memories N/A N/A 10.33 (5.30) 17.17 (9.56)
(2–22) (4–35)
Vividness 5.38 (1.09) 5.46 (.68) 5.29 (1.13) 5.45 (.60)
Repeated before 3.23 (1.15) 3.28 (.87) 2.44 (.81) 2.87 (.91)
Specific (proportion) .74 (.18) .75 (.20) .55 (.34) .64 (.23)
Concentration 3.75 (.91) 3.33 (.83) 3.13 (.81) 3.33 (.59)
Unusual 2.91 (.65) 3.17 (.61) 3.29 (.58) 3.15 (.58)
Age of event 18.08 (3.10) 17.50 (1.49) 19.95 (5.97) 17.64 (2.70)
Pleasant. event 3.27 (.86) 3.51 (.52) 3.53 (.39) 3.44 (.46)
Pleasant. memory 3.60 (.76) 3.49 (.48) 3.66 (.49) 3.57 (.48)
aSI = self-interrupted.
bEI = experimenter-interrupted.
**(first row: means and standard deviations; second row: min and max).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0089582.t001
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independently in triggering IAMs. In addition, the age of the
memories, which typically dated back approximately 3 to 4 years,
is consistent with previous results showing that involuntary
memories refer to relatively recent periods in life (see [7,8,17]).
Several, and not mutually exclusive, explanations might be
advanced for the effect of instructions and type of interruption.
The greater number and different characteristics of memories
obtained when instructions mentioned IAMs could be due to a
priming effect, that might enhance the overall activation of
autobiographical memories and help those already more active
(e.g. more rehearsed) to pass the awareness threshold and ‘pop’ in
mind (for other forms of chaining effects in IAMs, see [2,3,19]).
The fact that memories reported when instructions focused on
IAMs were indeed more rehearsed lends support to this
interpretation. In addition, instructions focusing on involuntary
memories might produce some form of selection at retrieval. This
could be reflected in a report bias, in which only mental contents
that reflect what people naively understand involuntary memories
should be are reported. Memories are usually and naively
conceived as referring to specific personal events, which are
indeed the type of memories we found to be more frequent in the
reports when the instructions explicitly stated that the aim was to
study IAMs. Selection at retrieval could also be reflected in
focusing attention during retrieval more narrowly just on
memories, leaving out other mental contents. Conversely, in the
‘‘Self-interruption’’ group, in which ‘memory’ was not mentioned,
attention would instead be spread across all mental contents that
pop in mind, with the consequence that possibly some IAMs
would go unnoticed. This would lead to a smaller number of IAMs
in the ‘‘No IAM instructions’’ condition, as obtained here. In other
words, when no memory instructions are given, people might end
up omitting a number of IAMs that, if they paid attention, would
be reported. Although the present data don’t provide a definitive
answer on whether this selection occurs at a pre-retrieval or post-
retrieval level, the attentional explanation advanced for the
‘‘memory mentioning’’ effect receives some support also from
the other result of this study, showing that a higher amount of
IAMs is obtained when participants are unexpectedly interrupted
by the experimenter (compared to the self-interruption condition).
In the ‘‘Experimenter-interruption’’ condition participants
reported on average slightly more than one memory per
interruption. While rather counterintuitive, this was predicted in
light of previous results on ‘zoning out’ in mind-wandering tasks.
Being unexpectedly interrupted and requested to report memories
(in one condition) or mental contents (in the other) that come
spontaneously to mind helps individuals become aware of mental
contents that would otherwise go unnoticed [15,16]. Recent
theorizing about mind wandering suggests that meta-awareness
(i.e. one’s explicit knowledge of the current contents of thought),
corresponds to an intermittent process whereby individuals only
periodically notice the current contents of their mind. Direct
comparisons between self-catching measures of the mind-wander-
ing state (e.g. asking participants to press a response key every time
they notice by themselves that they have been mind wandering)
and probe-catching sampling (in which participants are intermit-
tently queried whether or not they were mind wandering, and if
they were, they are asked to indicate if they had been aware of this
fact) have shown that individuals routinely mind wander without
noticing it (zoning out) (see for a review and discussion [14]). In
our case, random interruptions then make individuals aware of the
mental contents at the time (and near the time) of the interruption,
thus boosting the number of items reported. In the present data,
this increase occurred not only for memories, but also for other
mental contents (when instructions did not mention IAMs). Lack
of awareness might also explain the relatively small number of
thoughts and memories reported, in face of the large number of
cues presented. Presenting so many cues might have a negative
effect on the level of awareness as cues capture attention, leaving
available fewer of the resources that are necessary in becoming
aware of mental contents during the mind-wandering task.
An alternative explanation of the relatively greater frequency of
reports in the experimenter interrupted condition is task demands
(the interruption itself may have caused the participants to
intentionally search and thereby possibly generate mental contents
fitting the task). This would imply that intentional retrieval (or
thought generation) would have occurred and the reports were not
about unintentional mental contents or memories. However there
is no reason why task demands should be different in the
‘‘Experimenter’’ and ‘‘Self-interruption’’ conditions. Future studies
should assess more directly the role of task demands, and also
examine the role of response bias.
The lower frequency of IAMs in the self-report condition could
also be explained by higher cognitive demand due to greater
monitoring of one’s mind in order to notice and report IAMs.
Previous studies have shown that IAMs are more frequent during
undemanding tasks, and it is possible that self-interruption
instructions could make the task more effortful when compared
to the experimenter-interruption condition, where monitoring the
content of consciousness occurs only when probed by the
experimenter. If enhanced monitoring/awareness is the correct
explanation for our data, then the greater number of mental
contents and memories in the scheduled interruption condition
suggests that diary studies, as well as studies using self-interruption
procedures, in which people necessarily report only involuntary
memories of which they are aware, have limited their investigation
to involuntary memories that are sufficiently activated to
spontaneously pass the awareness threshold. These can be
memories with special qualities, in which case the theoretical
explanations proposed so far on the nature and retrieval of IAMs
might not extend to all involuntary memories.
In the present study, the random interruptions scheduled by the
experimenter did not change the characteristics of the memories
that were assessed, even if the number of memories reported
increased. This might indicate that aware involuntary memories
are not qualitatively different from unaware ones, and that passing
the awareness threshold is a random event. However future studies
should assess the effect on other characteristics of the memory,
such as the degree of self-involvement in the event portrayed in the
memory, or how the content is linked to self-relevant goals, etc.,
which represent crucial elements in autobiographical memory (see
for example Conway’s [20] model).
The lack of differences in characteristics suggest also that the
increase in memories in this case should not be due to intentional
selection or to reporting bias at retrieval. Rather, as in other forms
of mind-wandering tasks, increase might be due to increased
awareness of mental contents that without those interruptions
would remain below threshold.
While all the explanations advanced so far are consistent with
the present data, it will be the task of future studies to assess which
explains them best. Future studies should also assess whether the
differences obtained in the current experiment might also be due
to differences in the nature of the retrieval process activated in the
various conditions.
In the present work we also found a large inter-individual
variability in the number of mental contents and memories
reported during the vigilance task. This finding are probably
inherent to the nature of the task (some people report substantially
more while others substantially less), which would indicate that
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there are potentially important individual differences in cognitive
and metacognitive processes between those who reported many
mental contents and those who reported only a few. Future studies
should investigate in a more systematic fashion the role of
individual differences in metacognitive processes (monitoring and
control) as well as personality variables (e.g. extroversion vs.
introversion) on the tendency to report mental contents.
Possible limitations of the current study
While we have so far referred to the memory reports obtained
here as involuntary memories, in principle task-unrelated thoughts
in mind-wandering tasks can be intentional, as they can be
initiated in a goal directed fashion. For example, participants
might intentionally make plans for the future or think about past
events even just to relieve boredom. Thus, the memories identified
using this methodology might not necessarily directly map on to
the notion of involuntary memories (which are by definition
unintentional).
While this is an important limitation, it does not apply just to the
present study, but to all previous work on involuntary memories.
The criticism is particularly true for those studies in which
participants are directly and overtly asked to report involuntary
memories, both in the lab [5,6] and in diary studies [7–9].
However, in order to limit this potential problem, instructions in
this and previous laboratory studies [6] clearly stated that
participants were to report mental contents/memories that
unintentionally, spontaneously, came to mind. Also, in the present
study, the variations on the procedure (i.e., not mentioning
memories at all for half of the participants) were devised with the
aim to reduce the risk of reporting intentional (rather than
unintentional) memories. This study also represents the first
attempt to understand if different ‘involuntary’ memory proce-
dures might produce memories of different quality.
In ‘‘No IAM instructions’’ conditions participants were asked to
classify their mental contents only after completing the vigilance
task, which might represent a limitation of this study. However,
participants rarely had any difficulty in classifying what they
reported as a memory or a more generic mental content. It is
possible that in some (very rare) cases our data might have omitted
some memories, or included some non-memories, but this would
not change the pattern of results of this study. The results obtained
in the present study are interesting and informative. However,
future studies are necessary to assess whether our findings apply
exclusively to involuntary memories, or characterize also voluntary
autobiographical memories. This is an important point that has
not been addressed here, but that might shed additional light to
the actual nature of involuntary memories.
In the present study we examined a relatively small number of
participants, and a replication of these results would be welcome.
Nonetheless, we believe that the significant results will hold also in
a larger sample as unpublished data from other labs reported a
similar pattern of results.
Strength of our results
Despite these limitations, our data clearly demonstrate, for the
first time, that the procedure used to elicit IAMs strongly affects
both the amount of memories obtained and their characteristics
and that modifications in the procedure might change the results
obtained about involuntary memories. This suggests that what is
currently known about involuntary memories might still be very
far from the final picture and probably important components of
the processes involved in the retrieval of involuntary memories are
still missing.
In any case, a firm point made by our result is to show the
necessity of supplementing diary studies on involuntary memories
with experimental work, if we want to reach an adequate
understanding of how involuntary memories are retrieved. Very
recent experimental work in this area (e.g. [4]) represents a very
important step in that direction.
After having compared the four methods, we are in a better
position to understand what their effect is. Is any of the four
methods to prefer over the others? While we believe there are pros
and cons with each method, the response to the question depends
also on the aim of the study. The method in which participants are
not informed that the aim of the study is to collect involuntary
memories is in our opinion preferable to the one in which such
directions are given, as these directions seem to change not only
the likelihood of obtaining memories but also their characteristics.
Self-interruptions seem to limit the output to memories that are
over the awareness threshold, and thus should be used when the
aim of the study is to examine the characteristics of these specific
memories, or the variables that facilitate the report (output) of
these memories. We believe, however, that the most interesting
question about the retrieval of IAMs refers to understanding the
factors that by activating existing information in autobiographical
memory bring IAMs to an aware level. To this aim, in future
studies one should compare Self and Experimenter-interruption
conditions when participants are not aware that the aim is on
IAMs and manipulate variables that are likely to increase the
activation of memory representations, such as priming, which has
already been shown to affect involuntary memory report [19,21].
In one study [22], we have shown, for example, that both explicit
and implicit priming affects the rate of IAMs. In this way, one can
compare memories that are still below the level of awareness and
reach awareness only when people are asked to focus their
attention on spontaneous mental activity, with memory represen-
tations that have received sufficient activation by external cues to
be above the aware level. Much still needs to be done to
understand how IAMs are retrieved, and the results future studies
can help understand the extent to which factors that typically
modulate retrieval in voluntary memories also affect involuntary
retrieval.
Conclusions
This study shows that both instructions and procedure affect the
rate and in part the characteristics of involuntary memories, a
result that suggests that it is possible that the findings of previous
studies might be limited to some types of involuntary memories
and not others. In addition, these data hint at the possibility that
involuntary memories, as products of the mental activity of a
mind-wandering task, are one component of a rather constant flux
of mental contents that can pass or not pass the awareness
threshold and thus capture attention and be reported.
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